On the basis of information relating to the activities and procedures of the National Security Authority (NSA) in the screening of natural persons, which has been published in certain media, I consider it necessary to comment on some of these allegations and views.

First of all, I would like to emphasise that the NSA, as the central administrative authority, can only take such steps and acts as it is legally entitled to do. This Act is Act No. 412/2005 Coll., on the protection of classified information and on security capacity, as amended, on the basis of which the NSA is the guarantor of the protection of classified information in the Czech Republic, including in relation to foreign countries.

One of the conditions for access by individuals to such classified information is a certificate issued by the NSA in a security procedure. The method of carrying out the security procedure is precisely described in Act No. 412/2005 Coll. The NBÚ bases its proceedings on documents obtained from other entities. This mainly concerns information from the Police of the Czech Republic, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, intelligence services and other entities, as well as information provided by the applicant for the certificate himself in the course of the procedure. In this context, I would like to highlight the fact that the NSA is not entitled to obtain information by its own investigation or even by intercepting the phone, it merely analyses the documents and information provided to it. This means that the NSA in no way replaces the activities of the intelligence services and the police, nor does it use their procedures and methods. The accuracy of the data provided by the NSA is the responsibility of the State authorities that provided them.

Classified information is divided into 4 levels according to its importance: Reserved, Confidential, Secret and Top Secret. For the classification level Dedicated Employer verifies the age of majority, legal capacity and criminal integrity of the person. The significance of other classification levels is then also reflected in the scope of actions in the proceedings carried out by the NSA. In addition, the Confidential NSA verifies the applicant's nationality, personality (psychological status) and assesses its so-called security reliability. Safety reliability means that no safety concern is identified for the applicant. Again, all safety risks are precisely described in Act No. 412/2005 Coll. In the case of the Secret and Top Secret levels, the conditions for issuing the certificate are the same as in the case of the Confidential level, but the NSA detects these security risks more deeply in the applicant's past and, in addition, is entitled (in the case of the Top Secret level, obliged) to ask the intelligence service or the Police of the Czech Republic to conduct an investigation into the applicant and persons living with the applicant in the household.

At the same time, the scope of the acts carried out by the NSA in the procedure for issuing certificates for individual classification levels corresponds to the deadlines laid down in Act No 412/2005, in which these procedures must be concluded: for the Confidential level, this period is three months, for the Secret level, nine months, and for the Top Secret level, the procedure must be completed within twelve months. These deadlines may be extended by the Director of the NSA up to twice in the event that the intelligence service, the Police of the Czech Republic, a state authority or another body cannot communicate the results of the investigation or the requested information to the NSA within the aforementioned deadlines.

In the press, the often mentioned affiliation or cooperation with the former State Security (StB) is, of course, a fact that is carefully assessed by the NSA as a potential security risk. When evaluating this cooperation or the NBÚ's competence, it is based on the preserved archival materials provided to it. As regards cooperation, the mere finding that an applicant is included in the lists of StB collaborators cannot automatically constitute an obstacle to the issue of a certificate, since the law requires that the specific content of that cooperation be identified and evaluated. The NSA is therefore obliged to evaluate the length, nature and content of this cooperation, i.e. also to assess whether it was a conscious, voluntary and active cooperation or a co-operation enforced. Nor can a security risk be inferred from the mere fact of belonging to the former StB.

The NBÚ's decision-making practice on these issues has, of course, evolved. Until the end of 2005, the decisions of the Director of the NSA were reviewed by the College of Public Prosecutors and subsequently by the Administrative Court. The College, whose legal opinion was binding on the NSA, has repeatedly pointed to the need to evaluate precisely the content and nature of the competence or cooperation with the StB, not just the fact of registration in the list of collaborators or members of the StB.

A similar procedure has been followed since 2006 by the Appeals Committee of the Director of the NSA, consisting of representatives of state authorities, which submits proposals for a decision on an appeal to the Director of the NSA. Those decisions of the Director of the NSA are also subject to judicial review.

It should be pointed out that it is the members of the appeals committee and the judges who, in the event of judicial review of the decisions of the director of the NSA, are, in addition to the staff of the NSA conducting the proceedings, the parties to those proceedings and their legal representatives, the only persons authorised under Act No 412/2005 to acquaint themselves with the information contained in specific security files. Other persons do not have access to the data in the security files.

In the event of doubt as to whether a security procedure has been carried out in accordance with the law, there is also the possibility of contacting a special supervisory body of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic set up to monitor the activities of the NSA.

Finally, I consider it necessary to draw attention again to the fact that the NSA is not entitled to disclose information relating to specific security procedures to a person or entity other than a participant in the security procedure, which is only an applicant for the issue of a certificate of a natural person. Section 124 of Act No 412/2005 states that data from a security file may be used only for the purposes of performing tasks under this Act. By making them available for other purposes and to other persons, the NSA itself would be in breach of the law.